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Abstract
We study the e￿ect of ￿nancial distress in foreign parent banks on local SME ￿nanc-
ing in 14 central and eastern European countries during the early stages of the 2007-2008
￿nancial crisis. We use survey data on applicant and non-applicant ￿rms that enable
us to disentangle e￿ects driven by shocks to the banking system from recession-driven
demand shocks that may vary across lenders. We ￿nd strong evidence that credit tight-
ened in the relatively early stages of the crises caused by the following types of bank
￿nancial distress: 1) low equity ratio; 2) low Tier 1 capital ratio; and 3) losses on ￿nan-
cial assets. We also ￿nd that foreign banks transmit to Main Street a larger portion of
similar ￿nancial shocks than domestic banks. The observed decline in credit is greater
among high-risk ￿rms and ￿rms with fewer tangible assets.
JEL classi￿cation: E44, E51, F34, G21
Keywords: credit crunch, ￿nancial crisis, bank lending channel, business lending
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While evidence abounds of a bank-driven “capital crunch” in Europe during the recent financial 
crisis, the question of the relative contribution of foreign banks vs. domestic banks to this process has 
been left largely unanswered. In order to fill this void, we combine data on 141 banks from 
2005 and 2008 waves of the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey. While we do 
not have an exact match between a firm and a bank, we can still match firms and banks by locality of 
incorporation (operation). This allows us to empirically address two questions: 1) Did firms in 
localities populated by banks affected by the crisis face higher rejection rates than firms in localities 
populated by “healthy” banks? And 2) Did firms in localities populated by foreign banks affected by 
the crisis face higher rejection rates than firms in localities populated by similarly affected domestic 
banks?
Importantly, in answering both questions, one has to account for the contamination of the estimates 
by demand shifts, as firms’ financial positions also deteriorated during the recession, decreasing their 
appetite for bank loans. To that end, we employ data on applicant firms to control for the changing 
risk in the pool of borrowers. More importantly, recent research has shown that only 1/3 of 
constrained firms are firms that apply and are rejected, while 2/3 of constrained firms are firms that 
need a loan but are discouraged from applying. Therefore, even using the universe of loan application 
will not lead to the construction of proper proxies for credit constraints. To address the issue, we use 
survey data on firms that stayed out of the application process because they were discouraged by high 
interest rates, high collateral requirements, and high rejection rates, distinguishing them from firms 
which stayed out of the application process because they were in good financial health.  
We find strong evidence for the international transmission of financial distress. In particular, credit 
tightened in the relatively early stages of the crises as a result of: 1) low equity ratios; 2) low Tier 1 
capital ratios; and 3) severe losses on financial assets. For example, we find that in foreign bank-
dominated markets if the average Tier 1 capital ratio of the parent of banks present in a particular 
locality decreases by 2 standard deviations, the probability of firms in that locality being constrained 
increased by about 55%. The estimates involving equity capital and losses on financial assets are of 
similar magnitude. Importantly, foreign banks are more likely to shrink their portfolio in response to 
financial distress, especially low Tier 1 capital ratios, the measure of financial distress that is most 
consistently associated with credit rationing. Finally, we find that financial distress is transmitted 
differently across firms and industries, in that firms that are informationally opaque and firms with 
fewer tangible assets suffer the most.  
The evidence in the paper points to several important policy conclusions. First, while the benefits of 
financial integration are well understood, we have also shown some of the costs associated with it, 
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especially at times of exceptional downside risk. Second, we find that various measures of bank 
capital depletion are associated with the transmission of distress, while, for example, exposure to 
problem loans and the size of the deposit base are not. This finding should inform the debate on the 
pro-cyclicality of capital requirements.  
The financial crisis of 2007-2008 has finally laid to rest the idea that the effect of large financial 
shocks can be confined locally. In this paper, we demonstrate empirically how the collapse of 
housing values in the U.S. has affected the financing conditions of, for example, Slovak firms 
through the deteriorating portfolios of Austrian, Belgian, and Italian banks, loaded with assets backed 
by those mortgages, and operating in Slovakia through their subsidiaries. While the credit crunch 
only started in the third quarter of 2007, banks kept tightening credit standards until as late as the 
fourth quarter of 2008, and most likely long after that. Thus, despite the coordinated actions of 
various national and supranational authorities, which kept the global financial system from collapsing 
after the fall of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, it is likely that the losses that the financial 
system endured have induced, and will continue to induce, a much larger impact on the real sector 
than the one estimated in this paper. The true extent of the credit crunch will only become clear with 
the availability of new, more comprehensive data. 
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1 Introduction
The increasing integration of the European banking industry o￿ers the prospect of important
gains in terms of e￿ciency and diversi￿cation, but it also creates potential risks. One such risk
is associated with the possibility that a shock to a cross-border bank’s capital will result in a
reduction in lending to ￿rms and consumers in an economic environment that is uncorrelated with
the origins of that shock. Given the size and penetration of a number of west European and U.S.
banks in central and eastern Europe, their ￿nancial distress associated with the meltdown of sub-
prime mortgages and securitized products in 2007 and 2008 and the run on banks by short-term
creditors, counterparties, and borrowers concerned about the liquidity and solvency of the banking
sector1, may have led to such a realization.2 The goal of this paper is to put this hypothesis to the
test.
We investigate one key mechanism through which foreign ￿nancial distress may have been trans-
mitted to local economic conditions, namely the supply of credit to small and medium enterprises.
SMEs dominate the corporate landscape in central and eastern Europe, comprising up to 99% of
all ￿rms. Moreover, because of their opacity SMEs may be particularly vulnerable to contractions
in the supply of credit. With this high dependency on the SME sector and with immature capital
markets, banks are by far the main provider of funds for capital investment and expansion. An
important feature of the central and eastern European banking market is its ownership structure.
In particular, foreign ownership in the banking sector has grown so dramatically in the recent
decade, that by 2008 foreign banks controlled around 80% of the assets in the the region’s banking
industry. The serious ￿nancial distress of pan-European banks like Erste, KBC, and Societe Gen-
erale since 2007 stemming from economic circumstances unrelated to their operation in central and
eastern Europe provides a natural experiment to study the channels through which the e￿ects of
1See Brunnermeier (2009), Gorton (2009), and Ivashina and Scharfstein (2009) for a timeline of the 2007-2008
global ￿nancial crisis. See Table 1 for developments concerning the ￿nancial sector in the countries covered by this
paper.
2Signs of the negative e￿ects of the global ￿nancial crisis on business ￿rms in emerging Europe through the channel
of bank lending were seen as early as the Fall of 2007. For instance, in October, the EBRD’s chief economist Erik
Berglof warned that "the crisis in the West will be a serious one which will last for some time and this means it
will de￿nitely have an impact on our countries [...] due to the di￿culties and higher costs associated with obtaining
credit" (EBRD (2007)). The euro zone Bank Lending Survey indicated that euro zone banks started tightening
lending standards in Q3:2007 (ECB (2008)).
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NB? H;H=C;F =LCMCM NB;N MN;LN?> CH NB? 42 MJL?;> NBLIOAB ION NB? AFI<;F ?=IHIGS
.OL E?S >;N; =IG? @LIG ; MOLP?S I@ ; F;LA? ALIOJ I@ 2,$M CH ?G?LACHA $OLIJ? ;>GCHCMN?L?>
CH  JLCF  ;H>  JLCF  3B? >;N; ;FFIQ OM NI >CL?=NFS I<M?LP? LGM QBIM? FI;H ;JJFC=;NCIH
Q;M NOLH?> >IQH IP?L NB? =IOLM? I@ NB? JL?PCIOM S?;L IL QBC=B Q?L? >CM=IOL;A?> @LIG ;JJFSCHA @IL
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<;HE QBC=B AL;HN?>>?HC?> NB? FI;H Q? I<M?LP? NB? ?RN?HN I@ NB? IJ?L;NCIHMI @; F F< ; H E MJ L ? M ? H N
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M =CNS I@ CH=ILJIL;NCIH !S OMCHA <;F;H=? MB??N >;N; IH NB? J;L?HN <;HEM @IL?CAH IL
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FI=;FCNC?M BIQ?P?L ;L? M?LP?> <S DOMN ; B;H>@OF I@ <;HEM QCNB @IL?CAH IQH?LMBCJ I@ NBIM? P;LSCHA <S
=IOHNLS ;H> FI=;FCNS 3BCM ;FFIQM OM NI ;HMQ?L NQI CGJILN;HN KO?MNCIHM  >C> <;HEM NL;HMGCN NB?CL
H;H=C;F >CMNL?MM <S MBLCHECHA FI;HM NI <OMCH?MM =OMNIG?LM CMMO?> <S NB?CL <L;H=B?M ;H> MO<MC>C;LC?M
CH NB? ?;LFS MN;A?M I@ NB? U =LCMCM ;H>  >C> @IL?CAH <;HEM NL;HMGCN NI NB? =ILJIL;N?
M?=NIL ; F;LA?L MB;L? I@ NB?CL L?MJ?=NCP? H;H=C;F NLIO<F?M NB;H >IG?MNC= <;HEM
3B? =F;MMC= JLI<F?G QCNB C>?HNC@SCHA ; =L?>CN =LOH=B CM NB;N LGM
 >?G;H> MB C @ N M> O L C H A;
=L?>CN =LOH=B @IFFIQCHA NB? >?N?LCIL;NCIH I@ LGM
 <;F;H=? MB??NM 3BCM QI O F >H I N< ?; HC M M O ?C @Q ?
Q?L? MNO>SCHA NB? =LIMM<IL>?L NL;HMGCMMCIH I@ H;H=C;F >CMNL?MM CHNI ;H ?=IHIGC= ;L?; CHMOF;N?>
@LIG NB;N >CMNL?MM NBLIOAB ;FF INB?L =B;HH?FM <ON NB? <;HE F?H>CHA =B;HH?F  M NB? MO<JLCG?
GILNA;A? =LCMCM Q;M ;MMI=C;N?> MCH=? CNM P?LS <?ACHHCHA QCNB NB? ?RJ?=N;NCIHM I@ ; AFI<;F L?=?MMCIH
NB? G?;MOL?> ??=N I@ <;HE FI;H MOJJFS MBI=EM QCFF FCE?FS <? =IHN;GCH;N?> <S >?G;H> MBC@NM 2IG?
MNO>C?M NB;N C>?HNC@S >?G;H> OM? NB? >?=FCH? CH FI;H ;JJFC=;NCIHM ;=LIMM >C?L?HNC;FFS ;?=N?> F?H>?LM
NI ;LAO? NB;N NB?L? B;P?H
N <??H P;LC;NCIHM CH NB? >?=L?;M? CH >?G;H> ;=LIMM F?H>?LM .H? JLI<F?G
QCNB NB;N C>?HNC=;NCIH ;JJLI;=B G;S <? FCGCN?> >;N; ;P;CF;<CFCNS IH FI;H ;JJFC=;NCIHM 'IQ?P?L
?P?H QB?H IH? I<M?LP?M NB? OHCP?LM? I@ FI;H ;JJFC=;NCIHM ;JJFC=;HN LGM =IOF> <? ; MSMN?G;NC=;FFS
NLOH=N;N?> MO<M;GJF? I@ ;FF LGM MIG? LGM >I HIN ;JJFS <?=;OM? NB?S >I HINH ? ? >= L ? > C N Q B C F ?
INB?LM >I HIN ;JJFS <?=;OM? NB?S ;L? >CM=IOL;A?> -IN ;==IOHNCHA @IL >CM=IOL;A?> LGM L?MOFNM CH
,;8 DH8FG<BA <F 8FC86<4??L E8?8I4AG <A G;8 6BAG8KG B9 G;8 2.<8AA4 <A<G<4G<I8 HA78E J;<6; G;8 @4=BE 54A>F 46G<I8
<A G;8 E8:<BA 6B@@<GG87 GB >88C G;8<E 8KCBFHE8 GB HA6;4A:87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JLC=?M CH );J;H >OLCHA NB? ?;LFS M ;?=N?> NB? IJ?L;NCIHM I@ );J;H?M? <;HE MO<MC>C;LC?M ;<LI;>
(H J;LNC=OF;L NB?S MBIQ NB;N NB? >?=FCH? CH NB? J;L?HNM
 LCME<;M?> =;JCN;F L;NCI NL;HMF;N?> CHNI ;
MCAHC=;HN >?=FCH? CH NIN;F FI;HM <S NB? 42 MO<MC>C;LC?M "B;P; ;H> /OLH;H;H>;G  ;H>
2=BH;<F  OM? NB? ?RIA?HIOM MBI=E JLIPC>?> <S NB? 1OMMC;H =LCMCM I@  NI MNO>S NB? ??=N
IH F?H>CHA NI 42 ;H> /?LOPC;H <ILLIQ?LM L?MJ?=NCP?FS "?NIL?FFC ;H> &IF><?LA  MBIQ NB;N
NB? ?RCMN?H=? I@ CHN?LH;F =;JCN;F G;LE?NM QCNB @IL?CAH <;HE ;FC;N?M =IHNLC<ON?M NI ;H CHN?LH;NCIH;F
JLIJ;A;NCIH I@ >IG?MNC= FCKOC>CNS MBI=EM NI F?H>CHA <S ;FC;N?> <;HEM ;<LI;> (H NB? =IHN?RN I@
NB? H;H=C;F =LCMCM I@  (P;MBCH; ;H> 2=B;L@MN?CH  >I=OG?HN NB;N H?Q FI;HM NI F;LA?
B9 A4A6<4? 7<FGE8FF
 5HG 7H8 GB G;8 @4AL @<FF<A: 74G4 <A 4A>F6BC8 J8 7B ABG E8CBEG G;8F8 A7<A:F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borrowers declined by 79% by the end of 2008 relative to the peak of the credit boom (Q2:2007).
They analyze the e￿ect that the failure of Lehman Brothers had on the syndicated loan market
to identify the reduction in new lending. Jimenez, Ongena, Peydro, and Saurina (2009) use the
universe of bank loans by Spanish banks to identify separately the bank lending channel and the
balance sheet channel, and ￿nd that they dampen each other: more liquid ￿rms are less vulnerable
to the contraction of bank lending, and if banks have ample liquidity, the balance sheet channel
partially shuts down. Finally, Puri, Rocholl, and Ste￿en (2009) test the e￿ect of deteriorating
balance sheets of U.S. banks on lending to business ￿rms in Germany. While they account for the
shift in ￿rms’ loan demand, they do not account for the variation across lenders in the change in
the composition of ￿rms that select themselves out of the application process.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the data. Section 3 describes the empirical
methodology and the identi￿cation strategy. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5
concludes with the main ￿ndings of the paper.
2 Data
The data for our analysis come from three main sources. The core ￿rm level data come from the 2008
version of the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS), administered
jointly by the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.7 The
survey were carried out between March 10th and April 20th 2008 among 11;668 ￿rms from 30
countries in central and eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The survey response rate
was 36:9%. Surveyees who declined to participate or were unavailable for interviews accounted for
38:3% of the original target group. Firms that were ineligible due to the necessity to ful￿ll industry
quotas and ￿rm size quotas accounted for the remainder. We narrowed that sample down to the
countries that were most relevant in terms of foreign bank penetration. We complement this data
with analogical information on ￿rms operating in the same countries and localities derived from
the 2005 version of the survey. The ￿nal sample consists of 5;380 ￿rms in 14 countries: Albania,
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Montenegro,
7The dataset has recently started being used in published work, notably in Brown, Japelli, and Pagano (2009).
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NB? <;HEM JL?M?HN CH NB? "T?=B 1?JO<FC= B;> ;H ;P?L;A? L;NCI I@ A;CHM IH H;H=C;F ;MM?NM NI NIN;F
;MM?NM I@ 
 JJ?H>CR  CFFOMNL;N?M NB? >?AL?? I@ @IL?CAH <;HE J?H?NL;NCIH CH ?;=B =IOHNLS CH NB? M;GJF?
"F?;LFS ; ALIOJ I@  Q?MN $OLIJ?;H ;H> 42 <;HEM =IHNLIFM NB? P;MN G;DILCNS I@ ;MM?NM CH NB?
L?ACIH 3B?M? ;L? $LMN? &LIOJ 'SJI &LIOJ 1?C?CM?H ;H> 5IFEM<;HE  OMNLC; #?RC; ;H> *!"
!?FACOG #;HME? /;HE 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 2I=C?N? &?H?L;F? 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 !;S?LCM=B?
+;H>?M<;HE ;H> "IGG?LT<;HE 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  FJB; !;HE $%& $OLI<;HE $GJILCEC !;HE -;NCIH;F
!;HE I@ &L??=? ;H> /CL;?OM !;HE &L??=?  (! (L?F;H> (HN?MM; 2;H /;IFI ;H> 4HC"L?>CN
&LIOJ (N;FS (-& !;HE -?NB?LF;H>M 2Q?><;HE ;H> 2E;H>CH;PCME; $HMECF>; !;HE 2Q?>?H
;H> "CNC<;HE 42 3B?L? CM ;FMI MO<MN;HNC;F L?ACIH;F P;LC;NCIH CH NB? >?AL?? I@ J?H?NL;NCIH @IL
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example, the Greek banks operate mostly in south-eastern Europe, the Scandinavian banks in the
Baltic countries, and the Austrian banks in central Europe. In addition, there is one domestic
"global" bank, the Hungarian OTP, as well as cross-border penetration by, for example, Parex
Group - Latvia and Snoras Bank - Lithuania.
3 Empirical methodology and identi￿cation
3.1 Main empirical model
We start by using the 2008 cross-section data on bank balance sheets, ￿rm characteristics, and
credit constraints to check for a "credit crunch" by estimating the following basic model:
Yijkl = ￿1 ￿ Xijkl + ￿2 ￿ Financejk + ￿3 ￿ Dk + ￿4 ￿ Dl + "ijkl (1)
where Yijkl is a dummy variable equal to 1 if ￿rm i in city j in country k in industry l is
credit constrained in ￿scal year 2007; Xijkl is a matrix of ￿rm characteristics; Financejk is the
index of bank health in city j in country k; Dk is a matrix of country dummies; Dl is a matrix of
industry dummies; and "ijkl is an idiosyncratic error term. The ￿rm level characteristics control for
observable ￿rm-level heterogeneity. The two sets of dummy variables control for any unobserved
market and industry variation. Essentially, they eliminate the contamination of the estimates by
sectoral and macroeconomic circumstances, like growth opportunities, common to all ￿rms in the
same industry, or taxes, common to all ￿rms in a particular country.
Next, we pool the 2005 and 2008 samples in order to be able to conduct a proper pre-post
analysis using both ￿rms that were observed in 2007/2008 (the beginning of the ￿nancial crisis)
and in 2004/2005 (the peak of the credit cycle). We estimate the model
Yijkt = ￿1 ￿ Xijkt + ￿2 ￿ Financejk + ￿3 ￿ Dk + ￿4 ￿ Dt + "ijkl (2)
That procedure is analogical to (1), with the exception that we include year ￿xed e￿ects to
account for the change in common macro factors between 2005 and 2008, and we exclude the
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CH>OMNLS >OGGC?M <?=;OM? CH>OMNLC?M ;L? =F;MMC?> >C?L?HNFS CH NB? NQI MOLP?SM
3B? G;CH J;L;G?N?L I@ CHN?L?MN CH <INB GI>?FM CM  QBC=B G?;MOL?M NB? ??=N I@ H;H=C;F
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 ;L? ;MMI=C;N?> QCNB <CAA?L <;HE >CMNL?MM Q? ?RJ?=N NB? MCAH I@  NI <? H?A;NCP? 6?
=IHMNLO=N IOL <;HE >CMNL?MM CH>?R <S ;AAL?A;NCHA <;F;H=? MB??N CH@ILG;NCIH @LIG !;HEM=IJ? ;@N?L
>?N?LGCHCHA QBC=B <;HEM Q?L? JL?M?HN CH NB;N FI=;FCNS ;H> NB? ILCACH;F IQH?LMBCJ I@ ?;=B <;HE
CH NB;N FI=;FCNS 3B? OH>?LFSCHA ;MMOGJNCIH CH NB? ;<M?H=? I@ ; >CL?=N G;N=B I@ ?;=B FI;H NI NB?
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 FI=;FCNS I@ CH=ILJIL;NCIH
6? OM? NQI >C?L?HN Q?CABNCHA =LCN?LC; CH =IHMNLO=NCHA NB? CH>?R H;G?FS ACPCHA ?KO;F Q?CABN NI
?;=B <;HE CH NB;N J;LNC=OF;L FI=;FCNS IL Q?CABNCHA ?;=B <;HE
M H;H=C;F JIMCNCIH <S NB? HOG<?L I@
<L;H=B?M CN B;M CH NB? FI=;FCNS
'?L? CM ;H ?R;GJF? NI =F;LC@S NB? ;<IP? JLI=?>OL? 3B?L? ;L?  <;HEM CH $MNIHC; NB;N BIF> =FIM?
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<ON Q? ;FMI BSJINB?MCT? NB;N <;HEM QCNB ; @IL?CAH IQH?L ;L? GIL? FCE?FS NI >I MI NB;H >IG?MNC=
<;HEM %IL ?R;GJF? C@ <;HELG L?F;NCIHMBCJM ;L? J;LNC=OF;LFS MNLIHA ;H> CGJILN;HN <;HEM G;S
<? L?FO=N;HN NI L?>O=? =L?>CN NI NB?CL FIHANCG? >IG?MNC= =OMNIG?LM ;H> MBC@N GIL? I@ NB? MBI=E NI
IP?LM?;M G;LE?NM /??E ;H> 1IM?HAL?H 
3B?L? ;L? NQI Q;SM CH QBC=B Q? ;>>L?MM NBCM CMMO? %CLMN Q? ?MNCG;N?  ;H>  IH NB?
MO<M;GJF? I@ FI=;FCNC?M QB?L? NB? G;DILCNS I@ NB? <;HECHA ;MM?NM ;L? =IHNLIFF?> <S <L;H=B?M IL MO<
MC>C;LC?M I@ @IL?CAH <;HEM 3BCM ACP?M ;H ;HMQ?L NI NB? KO?MNCIH >I @IL?CAH <;HEM NL;HMGCN H;H=C;F
>CMNL?MM 2?=IH> CH IL>?L NI MNO>S QB?NB?L @IL?CAH IL >IG?MNC= <;HEM NL;HMGCN ; F;LA?L MB;L? I@
NB?CL L?MJ?=NCP? H;H=C;F >CMNL?MM Q? ?MNCG;N? NB? @IFFIQCHA >C?L?H=?CH>C?L?H=?M MJ?=C=;NCIH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I@ <;HEM <?FIHA NI <L;H=B?M IL MO<MC>C;LC?M I@ @IL?CAH <;HEM 3B? JLCG;LS =IHNLIF ALIOJ B?L? CM
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=IOHNLS NB?S >IH
N ;FFIQ OM NI N?MN QB?NB?L H;H=C;F >CMNL?MM >C?L?HNC;FFS
;?=NM LGM ;H> IOL ?MNCG;N?M ;L? JLIH? NI =IHN;GCH;NCIH <S FI=;NCIHMJ?=C= OHI<M?LP;<F?M
1?A;L>CHA NB? LMN JICHN CN CM A?H?L;FFS JL?>C=N?> NB;N CH@ILG;NCIH;FFS IJ;KO? LGM ;H> LGM QCNB
@?Q?L N;HAC<F? ;MM?NM ;L? GIL? FCE?FS NI <? MBON ION I@ =L?>CN G;LE?NM M?? @IL ?R;GJF? !?LA?L
.@?E ;H> 2Q;LS  !?=E #?GCLAV O =*OHN ;H> ,;EMCGIPC=  ;H> !LIQH );JJ?FFC
;H> /;A;HI  1?A;L>CHA NB? M?=IH> IH? G;=LI?=IHIGC= =CL=OGMN;H=?M FCE? OH?GJFISG?HN
OMO;FFS P;LS ;N NB? =CNS F?P?F ;H> MI IOL MJ?=C=;NCIH MI @;L QCFF <? =IHN;GCH;N?> <S NBCM P;LC;NCIH
3I ;>>L?MM <INB JICHNM Q? ?GJFIS IOL NBCL> ;H> H;F MJ?=C=;NCIH
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Yijkl = ￿1 ￿ Xijkl + ￿2 ￿ Financejk ￿ Zl + ￿3 ￿ Dl + ￿4 ￿ Djk + "ijkl (4)
Now the location dummies in Djk absorb the e￿ect of locality-speci￿c unobservables. The inter-
action term containing the industry-level benchmark for information opacity and asset tangibility
in Zl allows us to measure whether the potential e￿ect of the credit crunch is indeed strongest for
those ￿rms which theory predicts are most vulnerable to credit market shutdowns.
Finally, we need to emphasize that throughout the paper, it is implicitly assumed that the
e￿ect of bank ￿nancial distress is localized and realized predominately by ￿rms headquartered in
the locality in which the bank has operations. All our empirical speci￿cations presume that ￿rms
borrow from banks located near their address of incorporation, which is identical to the approach
in, for example, Gormley (2009). In general this is expected to hold as banks tend to derive
market power ex ante from geographical proximity (e.g., Degryse and Ongena (2005)). Lending
support to that conjecture, empirical work regarding lending relationships in di￿erent countries
has demonstrated that the average distance between ￿rms and banks is usually very small. For
example, Petersen and Rajan (2002) ￿nd that the median distance between a ￿rm and its main
bank in 1993 was only ￿ve miles (eight kilometers).
3.2 Isolating demand shocks
It is a common challenge of studies that analyze the association between ￿nancial distress and
bank lending to isolate supply shocks satisfactorily. Namely, it is likely that not only does loan
demand weaken for all ￿rms in periods when bank capital declines, but the composition of ￿rms that
demand credit during recessions changes. The solutions to this problem vary in the literature. For
example, Peek and Rosengren (1997) bypass this issue by claiming that the identi￿cation problem
is rather weak in the case of the international transmission of ￿nancial shocks into a recession-free
environment. However, the ￿nancial crisis of 2007-2008 was followed by one of the deepest global
recessions in postwar history, and this recession was already being predicted as soon as the extent of
the sub-prime mortgage meltdown became apparent in late summer 2007. Hence, as we observe the
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LGM CH IOL M;GJF? CH F;N?  ;H> ?;LFS  CN CM =IH=?CP;<F? NB;N NB?S Q?L? ;FL?;>S <?B;PCHA
CH ; Q;S =IHMCMN?HN QCNB ; AFI<;F L?=?MMCIH ?HPCLIHG?HN /OLC 1I=BIFF ;H> 2N??H  ;H>
)CG?H?T .HA?H; /?S>LI ;H> 2;OLCH;  CH=ILJIL;N? >;N; IH FI;H ;JJFC=;NCIHM NI ;==IOHN @IL
NB? ?RJFC=CN Q?;E?HCHA I@ NB? LG <;F;H=? MB??N =B;HH?F 'IQ?P?L NBCM MNL;N?AS >I?M HIN ;==IOHN
@IL NB? =B;HACHA =IGJIMCNCIH ;=LIMM <OMCH?MM F?H>?LM I@ LGM NB;N >?G;H> <;HE =L?>CN ;M NB?M?
MNO>C?M >I HIN I<M?LP? LGM QBC=B M?F?=N NB?GM?FP?M ION I@ NB? FI;H ;JJFC=;NCIH JLI=?MM >O? NI 
Q?;E IQH >?G;H> @IL FI;HM IL NI  <?CHA >CM=IOL;A?> <S NB? >?N?LCIL;NCHA F?H>CHA ?HPCLIHG?HN
-IN ;==IOHNCHA @IL NB;N ?MNCG;NCHA NB? NLO? ?RN?HN I@ NB? NL;HMGCMMCIH I@ H;H=C;F >CMNL?MM QCNB ;
<C;M
 M Q? ?RJF;CH?> CH 2?=NCIH  Q? ?FCGCH;N? NB? =IHN;GCH;NCIH I@ NB? ?MNCG;N?M CH>O=?> <S  <S
CH=ILJIL;NCHA >;N; IH >CM=IOL;A?> LGM CH NB? G?;MOL? I@ =L?>CN =IHMNL;CHN  M @IL  Q? ?FCGCH;N?
NB? ??=N I@ NB? <;F;H=? MB??N =B;HH?F <S CH=ILJIL;NCHA I<M?LP;<F? CH@ILG; N C I HI H L G MQ B C = B> C >
HIN ;JJFS @IL <;HE =L?>CN CH M=;F S?;L  <?=;OM? NB?S >C> HIN H??> IH? M?? 2?=NCIH  @IL NB?
?R;=N >?HCNCIH 6? ;JJFS '?=EG;H
M  M?F?=NCIH JLI=?>OL? NI ?FCGCH;N? NB? <C;M ;LCMCHA @LIG
NB? F?@NNLOH=;NCIH I@ NB? M;GJF? CH NB;N M?HM? 3BOM =L?>CN =IHMNL;CHN CM IHFS I<M?LP;<F? QB?H ;
LG ;=NO;FFS ;JJFC?M @IL ; FI;H ;H> NB? LG IHFS >I?M MI C@ CN H??>M IH? IL CN
M HIN >CM=IOL;A?>
+?N NB? >OGGS P;LC;<F?  ?KO;FM  C@ NB? LG >?MCL?M JIMCNCP? <;HE =L?>CN ;H> ?KO;FM  INB?LQCM?
3B? P;FO? I@  CM CH NOLH >?N?LGCH?> <S NB? F;N?HN P;LC;<F?
       
QB?L?  =IHN;CHM LG ;H> FI=;NCIH P;LC;<F?M NB;N G;S ??=N NB? LG
M R?> =IMNM ;H>
=IHP?HC?H=? ;MMI=C;N?> QCNB OMCHA <;HE =L?>CN 3B? P;LC;<F?  C @; H >   INB?LQCM?
3B? ?LLIL  CM HILG;FFS >CMNLC<ON?> QCNB G?;H  ;H> P;LC;H=?  ,I>?FM  ;L? NB?H
OJ>;N?> <S ;>>CHA NB? N?LG 

 NI NB? 1'2 QB?L?

 CM NB? CHP?LM? I@ ,CFF
M L;NCI '?=EG;H
 ;H> QB?L?  B;M <??H ?MNCG;N?> IH ; M?N I@ P;LC;<F?M NB;N CM F;LA?L <S ;N F?;MN IH? P;LC;<F?
NB?H NB? M?N I@ P;LC;<F?M CH    ;H>  L?MJ?=NCP?FS
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4 Empirical results
4.1 Bank credit application
Before considering our main empirical model, we ￿rst consider the bank credit application tests
that we use for our Heckman selection correction. Table 5 presents the results from the ￿rst stage
probit regression. The probability of needing bank credit is higher for ￿rms in more ￿nancially
distressed localities, in the sense of a low bank equity ratio and large losses on ￿nancial assets.
This implies that not accounting for that selection would bias the estimates of the transmission of
￿nancial distress towards zero. If there is such transmission, then by making sure that it is not
the case that the ￿nancially strong ￿rms are selecting themselves out of the application process in
locations where banks are severely distressed, we will be measuring an even stronger e￿ect than
when selection is not accounted for.
The need for bank credit increases in the size of the ￿rm, which is somewhat surprising as one
would expect small ￿rms to have a higher preference for bank credit. However, in a beginning-of-a-
recession environment it might be that small ￿rms are better equipped to ￿nance investment with
cash ￿ows than - potentially - more highly leveraged large ￿rms. In addition, some of the size e￿ects
may be picked by ownership and structural characteristics, as sole properitorships and stand-alone
￿rms have a higher demand for loans. The probability of desiring credit is higher for exporters
potentially due to their faster expansion, and for audited ￿rms, which might simply imply that ￿rms
choose to be audited (i.e., they are willing to pay for transparency) when they plan to apply for
bank credit.14 It may also be the case that audited ￿rms have access to ￿nancial statement lending
which may be a cheaper lending technology. In all, these results justify our selection procedure:
￿nancial distress not only (potentially) a￿ects business lending, but also the degree to which ￿rms
demand loans. Not accounting for this will introduce bias into the main estimates.
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4.2 Transmission of ￿nancial distress
4.2.1 Nonparametric di￿erence-in-di￿erences estimates
Table 6 gives a simple non-parametric illustration of the validity of our empirical strategy. We
average the data on rejection rates across localities for the 2008 sample, and for two distinct
criteria: a￿ected vs. non-a￿ected, and foreign bank-dominated vs. domestic bank-dominated. In
determining which localities are a￿ected, we look at Tier 1 capital and de￿ne "a￿ected" as localities
where the average Tier 1 capital ratio of banks present in that locality is in the bottom half of the
distribution in 2008. Likewise, we de￿ne "foreign-bank dominated" as localities where more than
half of the branches of all banks present in that localities are held by subsidiaries or branches of
foreign banks. The table implies that our estimates depend on the di￿erential response of foreign
vs. domestic banks to their respective ￿nancial problems. In particular, average rejection rates
across localities dominated by a￿ected vs. non-a￿ected banks are statistically identical if the banks
involved are mostly domestic (42:1% vs. 38:9%). However, in localities populated predominantly
by a￿ected foreign banks rejection rates were at 38:8%, while in localities populated predominantly
by non-a￿ected foreign banks rejection rates were at 23:4%, and this di￿erence is signi￿cant at the
1% level. This result is the ￿rst (albeit arguably imperfect) piece of evidence that foreign banks
reacted to their respective ￿nancial troubles by shrinking their loan portfolios relatively more.
4.2.2 Cross-section results
Table 7 reports the estimates of the e￿ect of parent banks’ ￿nancial distress on credit constraints
faced by local ￿rms for all ￿rms present in BEEPS 2008. We report the results of the model
in equation (1) alongside the results from the Heckman selection-corrected version of it in order
to contrast the two approaches. The three main explanatory variables of interest are: the ratio
of equity over total assets; the Tier 1 capital ratio; and the gain on ￿nancial assets over total
assets.15 We ￿rst report the results from the model in which each bank is given equal weight in
each locality where the bank is present (Panel A). As expected, all else equal, small ￿rms are more
15The e￿ect of other variables, like the ratio of problem loans to total loans, pro￿t, money market funding, and
gain on available for sales securities was tested, but the results were insigni￿cant.
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=L?>CN =IHMNL;CH?> JIN?HNC;FFS CH>C=;NCHA FIQ?L ;<CFCNS NI N;J ;FN?LH;NCP? =;JCN;F G;LE?NM ;O>CN?>
LGM ;L? F?MM =IHMNL;CH?> CGJFSCHA A;CHM @LIG NB? L?>O=NCIH I@ CH@ILG;NCIH;F IJ;=CNS ;H> LGM
NB;N ?RJILN J;LN I@ NB?CL JLI>O=NCIH ;L? F?MM =IHMNL;CH?> JIN?HNC;FFS MCAH;FFCHA NB? QCFFCHAH?MM I@
<;HEM NI F?H> NI LGM QCNB BCAB?L ALIQNB JLIMJ?=NM
3OLHCHA NI NB? P;LC;<F?M I@ CHN?L?MN IHFS NB? 3C?L  =;JCN;F L;NCI NOLHM ION NI B;P? ; MCAHC=;HN
CGJ;=N IH NB? JLI<;<CFCNS I@ LGM <?CHA =IHMNL;CH?> CH NB? =L?>CN G;LE?N 3B? ??=N B;M NB?
JL?>C=N?> MCAH H;G?FS <;HEM QBIM? J;L?HNM B;P? FIQ?L L?AOF;NILS =;JCN;FL ; N C I MN ? H >N IL ? M N L C = N
=L?>CN ;==?MM GIL? 3B? L?MOFN =IHNCHO?M NI BIF> IH=? Q? ?FCGCH;N? NB? ??=NI @N B ?< ; F ; H = ?M B ? ? N
=B;HH?F <S CHN?AL;NCHA ION NB? OHI<M?LP;<F? CH@ILG;NCIH ;MMI=C;N?> QCNB NB? >?=CMCIH NI ;JJFS @IL
<;HE =L?>CN IL NI M?F?=N IH?M?F@ ION I@ NB? ;JJFC=;NCIH JLI=?MM -OG?LC=;FFS ; MN;H>;L> >?PC;NCIH
>?=L?;M? CH ;P?L;A? 3C?L  =;JCN;F L;NCI @IL <;HEM CH ; J;LNC=OF;L FI=;FCNS CH=L?;M?M NB? JLI<;<CFCNS
I@ LGM CH NB;N FI=;FCNS <?CHA =IHMNL;CH?> <S ;<ION 
6B?H Q? ;JJFS NB? M?=IH> Q?CABNCHA =LCN?LCIH CH /;H?F ! H;G?FS Q?CABNCHA NB? JLI<;<CFCNS I@
NB? LG >ICHA <OMCH?MM QCNB ?;=B J;LNC=OF;L <;HE <S NB? HOG<?L I@ <L;H=B?M NB? <;HE B;M CH NB;N
FI=;FCNS NB? MCAHC=;H=? I@ NB? ??=N I@ NB? <;HE
M 3C?L  =;JCN;F L;NCI CH=L?;M?M 3B? G;AHCNO>? I@
NB? ??=N CM MG;FF?L NI NB? IH? CH /;H?F   ;H> ; MN;H>;L> >?PC;NCIH >?=L?;M? CH ;P?L;A? 3C?L 
=;JCN;F L;NCI @IL <;HEM CH ; J;LNC=OF;L FI=;FCNS CH=L?;M?M NB? JLI<;<CFCNS I@ LGM CH NB;N FI=;FCNS <?CHA
=IHMNL;CH?> <S ;<ION  3B? MCAH I@ NB? CHP?LM? I@ ,CFF
M L;NCI CM A?H?L;FFS JIMCNCP? CGJFSCHA NB;N
OHI<M?LP;<F?M QBC=B CH=L?;M? NB? JLI<;<CFCNS I@ H??>CHA <;HE =L?>CN ;FMI CH=L?;M? NB? JLI<;<CFCNS
I@ <?CHA =IHMNL;CH?> CH =L?>CN G;LE?NM
 FNBIOAB MIG? I@ NB? ??=NM ;L? IHFS MCAHC=;HN ;N NB?  F?P?F H;G?FS QB?H Q? Q?CABN
<;HEM
 3C?L  =;JCN;F L;NCIM ?KO;FFS L?=;FF NB;N <S FIIECHA ;N M=;F S?;L  Q? ;L? =;JNOLCHA
IHFS NB? CHCNC;F MN;A?M I@ NB? =LCMCM OJ NI ,;L=B   (H ;>>CNCIH NI NB;N IOL L?MOFNM ;L?
=IHN;GCH;N?> <S GIHNBM I@ JL?=LCMCM ?RJ?LC?H=? <?@IL?  OAOMN  (H NB;N M?HM? C@ NB?L? CM <C;M
CH IOL ?MNCG;N?M CN IHFS AI?M ;A;CHMN H>CHA ;HS NL;HMGCMMCIH I@ =LCMCML?F;N?> H;H=C;F >CMNL?MM
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4.2.3 Pooled 2008 and 2005 data
We next repeat the empirical tests on the sample of ￿rms that are present either in the 2008
and the 2005 BEEPS, employing equation (2) and the Heckman selection-corrected version of it.
This allows us to account for the changing composition of ￿rms that select themselves out of the
applciation process, going from the peak to the trough of the credit cycle. In other words, the
information on whether ￿rms do not apply for credit because they don’t need it, or because they
are discouraged, and how that changes over time, is used to eliminate the potential contamination
of our estimates by the correlation between credit needs and bank ￿nancial health. These results
are reported in Table 8.16 In this speci￿cation, only Tier 1 capital seems to matter for credit
constraints, once the e￿ect of demand for credit is eliminated (Panel A). Similar to the full sample,
once we weigh the probability of ￿rms doing business with a particular bank by the number of
branches the bank has in the locality of the ￿rm, the e￿ect of low Tier 1 capital ratio on rejection
probabilities becomes larger and signi￿cant at the 5% level (Panel B). In addition, lower capital
ratios are also associated with higher rejection probabilities - a two standard deviations decrease
in this variable results in a 24% higher rejection probability. Importantly, we con￿rm that not
accounting for selection introduces downward bias. This time, once year e￿ects are eliminated, the
sign of the inverse of Mill’s ratio is generally negative, implying that unobservables which increase
the probability of needing bank credit, also decrease the probability of being constrained in credit
markets.
4.3 International transmission of ￿nancial distress
The analysis so far conveys little information on the international transmission of ￿nancial shocks.
As illustrated by Table 4, still relatively large portions of the banking sector are owned by domestic
banks. That share in 2008 is 21% for the sample, 24% for Poland, 36% for Hungary and Latvia,
and 71% for Slovenia. In essence, so far we have measured the transmission of distress from the
￿nancial to the corporate sector regardless of bank ownership. For that reason, we next improve
the model by restricting the sample to localilties where a majority of the assets of present banks
16In all tables to follow, only coe￿cients of interest are reported for brevity.
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are held by foreign banks. That share is calculated individually for each locality by calculating the
share of retail branches held by subsidiaries and branches of foreign banks present in that particular
locality by the total number of bank branches in that locality. We then look at localities with at
least 2/3 foreign presence.
Table 9 reports the estimates of this empirical exercise on the international transmission of
￿nancial distress during the 2007-2008 crisis. It turns out that once we restrict our attention to
foreign bank-dominated localities, all measures of ￿nancial distress matter (in the pooled sample).
In other words, higher ￿nancial distress is associated with lower loan granting probability when
￿nancial distress is measured as a low equity ratio, a low Tier 1 capital ratio, or high losses on
￿nancial assets. Numerically, a 2-standard deviation decrease in equity capital, Tier 1 capital, and
gains on ￿nancial assets is associated with a 31%, 40%, and 11% increase in rejection rates, respec-
tively. This result holds after the correction for the possibility that weak ￿rms select themselves
out of the application process in the case of Tier 1 capital and equity capital, and only appears
before accounting for selection in the case of losses on ￿nancial assets in the pooled sample.
4.4 Transmission of ￿nancial distress: foreign vs. domestic
An important question that arises given the evidence so far is, do foreign or domestic banks transmit
a larger portion of an identical ￿nancial shock. Table 10 reports the estimates from the di￿erence-
in-di￿erences regression where we compare the transmission of ￿nancial distress by domestic and
foreign banks, that is, equation (3). Tellingly, whenever signi￿cant, the interaction e￿ect implies
that foreign banks react to the same shock to balance sheets by shrinking their portfolio more than
domestic banks. This is observed in the case of shocks to Tier 1 capital and to equity capital. In
the case of equity capital, we observe the e￿ect both in the 2008 and in the pooled samples, while
in the case of Tier 1 capital ratios the e￿ect is observed only in the 2008 sub-sample. Consequently,
we can conclude with a fair degree of statistical certainty that foreign banks transmit more of an
identical ￿nancial shock to their capital than domestic banks.
Apart from a parametric con￿rmation of the non-parametric observation in Table 6, this result
o￿ers important insights into the role of foreign banks in emerging markets. In general, the e￿ect of
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foreign banks on business lending in the literature is ambiguous. A large literature has found that
foreign bank presence is associated with higher access to loans (Clarke, Cull, and Peria (2006)),
higher ￿rm-level sales (Giannetti and Ongena (2009)), and lower loan rates and higher ￿rm leverage
(Ongena and Popov (2009)). On the other hand, Berger, Klapper, and Udell (2001), Mian (2006),
and Gormley (2009) show that foreign banks tend to ￿nance only larger, established, and more
pro￿table ￿rms. Our paper complements that picture by providing evidence that while at the peak
of the credit cycle lending by foreign banks is indistinguishable from lending by domestic banks in
terms of acceptance rates, foreign banks do tend to shrink their loan portfolio following a capital
crunch, even after controlling for the degree of ￿nancial distress.
4.5 Transmission of ￿nancial distress: di￿erential e￿ects
Finally, we ask which ￿rms are most a￿ected from the transmission of ￿nancial distress. There
are clear arguments in the literature on which ￿rms and industries should be most a￿ected by
credit rationing. Information asymmetries and the tangibility of the ￿rm’s assets, for example, are
expected to play an important role in explaining di￿erences in credit availability across ￿rms. High-
risk ￿rms tend to su￿er more from credit rationing, especially when foreign bank lending is involved
(Berger, Klapper, and Udell (2001)). In a global recessionary environment, ￿rms are expected to
be riskier if, for example, a large share of their pro￿ts traditionally comes from exports. Regarding
asset tangibility, Berger, Ofek, and Swary (1996) show that ￿rms with less tangible assets are more
likely to lose access to credit when banks reprice risk. The rationale is that lenders rely more on
collateral when making lending decision rather than investing in costly screening technologies, and
this problem will tend to be exacerbated in an environment where risk is suddenly priced higher.
We proceed by collecting data on mature U.S. ￿rms and using it to construct industry bench-
marks for asset tangibility. The rationale for doing so goes back to Rajan and Zingales (1998) who
argued that the actual capital structure of small ￿rms is a function of ￿nancial constraints, while
the capital structure of large mature ￿rms is more representative of the cross-industry variations in
the scale of projects, gestation period, the ratio of hard vs. soft information, the ratio of tangible
vs. intangible assets, follow-up investments, etc. In addition, doing so for large U.S. ￿rms makes
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in industries with low per-worker capital.
5 Conclusion
The ￿nancial crisis of 2007-2008, which started with the meltdown of sub-prime mortgages and
securitized products and which has been characterized by severe losses and depletion of bank
capital, has spurred unprecedented government recapitalization programs and liquidity injections
by central banks. Since the inception of the crisis, it was feared that this depletion of capital may
result in a severe credit crunch, especially to the corporate sector in countries populated by the
hardest hit banks. Because the European economy is heavily bank-dependent and SMEs - usually
the most vulnerable to a credit crunch due to their opacity - comprise up to 99% of the corporate
sector, it was feared that European ￿rms would be particularly heavily hit, despite the fact that
the causal factors of the credit crunch originated elsewhere.
In this paper, we investigate empirically the international transmission of ￿nancial distress,
from the loss in value of ￿nancial assets to the balance sheets of big European and U.S. banks to
business lending in their foreign markets - speci￿cally, central and eastern Europe. Several current
unpublished studies have documented a credit crunch associated with weakened capital positions,
however, ours is the ￿rst one to simultaneously 1) demonstrate the cross-border dimensions of this
phenomenon, and 2) eliminate the contamination of the lending channel by selection bias resulting
from the changing composition of ￿rms’ demand for credit during recessions and by the failure to
account for discouragement in the proxy for credit constraint.
We ￿nd that di￿erent types of ￿nancial distress at western European and U.S. parent banks
are associated with a signi￿cant impact on business lending to central and eastern European ￿rms.
While we do not observe an actual match between a bank and a ￿rm, we match ￿rms and banks
by the locality of their respective operation. We ￿nd that as early as late 2007/early 2008, ￿rms
reported higher credit constraints in localities populated by branches or subsidiaries of banks who
in 2007 and 2008 had low equity capital, low Tier 1 capital ratios, and had recorded severe losses
on ￿nancial assets. Importantly, we ￿nd that this e￿ect is stronger for localities predominantly
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Table 1. 
Timeline of events during the 2007-2008 crisis concerning banks and countries in the data 
Timeline Country  Event 
    
Aug. 2007 – Aug. 2008 
Germany  Bayerische LandesBank is one of three LandesBanken 
to receive capital injections, credit lines, and asset-
backed securities loss guranatees. 
Sept. 2008  France  The government recapitalizes Dexia. 
U.S.  Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, containing a 
commitment for up to 700 bln. USD to purchase bad 
assets from banks.  
Italy  The parliament approves a law granting the 
government the possibility to recapitalize distressed 
banks. 
Netherlands  The government announces that public fudns can be 
used for bank recapitalization, of which 20 bln. EUR 
are immediately available. 
France  The Government approves 320 bln. EUR to provide 
loans to banks and other financial firms, including a 40 
billion euro recapitalization plan. 
Sweden The  government  announces that it will guarantee up to 
1.5 trillion SEK in new debt issues, and a 15 billion 
SEK stabilization fund. 
Oct. 2008 
Germany The  government  announces a 400 billion EUR plan to 
guarantee bank financing, including a 70 billion EUR 
recapitalization fund. 
US  The Treasury subscribes 20 bln. USD preferred shares 
at Citigroup and ring-fences its troubled assets worth 
up to 300 billion USD. 
Italy  The government approves a law to inject capital into 
sound banks. 
Nov. 2008 
Germany  Bayerische LandesBank receives 7 billion EUR of 
capital from the Bavarian state. 
Dec. 2008  Germany  The Finance ministry provides Bayerische LandesBank 
with 15 billion EUR . 
Germany  The Finance ministry provides Commerzank with a 8.2 
billion EUR loan, and buys 1.8 trillion EUR worth of 
equity. 
France  The government implements a second round of bank 
recapitalization  for 10.5 billion EUR. 
Jan. 2009 
Netherlands  The Dutch government provides a cack-up facility to 
back up the risks of ING’s securitized mortgage 
portfolio worth 35.1 billion EUR. 
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Table 3.  
Summary statistics: Credit demand and access 
    
 2008  2005 
Country  Need loan  Constrained  Need loan  Constrained 
Albania 0.29  0.47  0.74  0.46 
Bulgaria 0.58  0.52  0.65  0.45 
Croatia 0.59  0.42  0.77  0.19 
Czech Republic  0.53  0.32  0.78  0.38 
Estonia 0.54  0.27  0.58  0.47 
Hungary 0.41  0.31  0.88  0.42 
Latvia 0.59  0.48  0.74  0.58 
Lithuania 0.60  0.23  0.70  0.61 
Macedonia 0.59  0.50  0.77  0.82 
Montenegro 0.78  0.48  0.80  0.45 
Poland 0.53  0.41  0.66  0.59 
Romania 0.61  0.33  0.75  0.47 
Slovakia 0.53  0.40  0.60  0.38 
Slovenia 0.64  0.15  0.77  0.12 
Total 0.57  0.37  0.72  0.46 
Note: The table presents statistics on the share of firms who declare bank loans desirable, and the share 
of firms out of those that need a lon that have been formally rejected or did not apply because they found 
access to finance too difficult, by country. The data are for the fiscal year 2007 (until March 31, 2008). 
See Appendix 1 for exact definitions. Source: BEEPS (2008 and 2005). 
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Table 5.  
Probability of desiring bank credit 




Tier 1 capital ratio 
Finance = 
Gains on fin assets 
Finance -0.067  0.033  -0.021 
 (0.040)*  (0.066)  (0.013)* 
Small firm  -0.211  -0.208  -0.206 
 (0.055)***  (0.055)***  (0.055)*** 
Big firm  0.088  0.089  0.093 
 (0.119)  (0.119)  (0.119) 
Public company  0.044  0.045  0.042 
 (0.127)  (0.127)  (0.127) 
Private company  0.191  0.192  0.192 
 (0.098)**  (0.098)**  (0.097)** 
Sole proprietorship  0.256  0.255  0.260 
 (0.098)***  (0.098)***  (0.097)*** 
Privatized 0.030  0.026  0.029 
 (0.064)  (0.064)  (0.063) 
Exporter 0.121  0.122  0.124 
 (0.045)***  (0.045)***  (0.044)*** 
Competition 0.136  0.150  0.150 
 (0.046)***  (0.048)***  (0.047)*** 
Audited 0.076  0.075  0.079 
 (0.046)*  (0.045)*  (0.045)* 
Subsidized 0.282  0.283  0.292 
 (0.061)***  (0.061)***  (0.061)*** 
Firm age  0.001  0.001  0.001 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Country fixed effects  Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes 
Observations 4,618  4,618  4,722 
Pseudo R-squared  0.07  0.07  0.07 
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm desires bank credit. ‘Finance’ is 
one of the three financial variables from Table 4. Each finance variable is locality-specific and is 
constructed by weighting equally the respective financial variable for each parent bank which has at least 
one branch or subsidiary in that locality. Ommited category in firm size is ‘Medium firm’. All 
regressions include country and year fixed effects. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 
5% level, and * at the 10% level. See Appendix 1 for exact definitions. Source: BEEPS (2005 and 2008) 
and Bankscope (2005 and 2008). 
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Table 6. 
Affected vs. non-affected banks: rejection rates
      
 Foreign-dominated  Domestic-dominated 
Affected localities  0.388  0.421 
Non-affected localities 0.234  0.389 
Difference 0.154***  0.032 
Note: The table reports a difference-in-differences estimate from a Mann-Whitney two-sided test. ‘Affected’ 
are localities where the average Tier 1 capital ratio of banks present in the bottom half of its distribution. For 
each locality, the variable is constructed by weighting by number of branches for each parent bank which has 
at least one branch or subsidiary in that locality. ‘Foreign banks-dominated’ are localities where more than 
half of the branches are held by subsidiaries or branches of foreign banks.  The statistical significance of the 
difference-in-differences estimate from a two-sided Mann-Whitney test can be found next to the difference, 
where *** indicates significance at the 1% level. Source: BEEPS (2008) and Bankscope (2008). 
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Table 7.  
Probability of being constrained (2008 sample) 
        
Panel A. Equally weighted bank data for each locality 
                    
   Finance = Equity/assets 
Finance =  
Tier 1 capital 
Finance =  
Gains on fin assets 
Finance -0.001  -0.003  -0.174 -0.173 0.036  0.064 
 (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.105)*  (0.110)*  (0.039)  (0.043) 
Small  firm  0.393 0.543 0.394 0.556 0.395 0.543 
  (0.084)*** (0.105)*** (0.084)*** (0.110)*** (0.084)*** (0.109)*** 
Big  firm  -0.184 -0.141 -0.186 -0.138 -0.187 -0.132 
  (0.185) (0.194) (0.186) (0.195) (0.186) (0.194) 
Public  company  0.322 0.315 0.323 0.314 0.324 -0.312 
  (0.216) (0.226) (0.216) (0.226) (0.216) (0.226) 
Private company  -0.104 -0.127 -0.106 -0.129 -0.102 -0.118 
  (0.171) (0.183) (0.171) (0.183) (0.171) (0.182) 
Sole proprietorship  -0.065  -0.017 0.064 -0.015 0.065 -0.001 
  (0.177) (0.196) (0.177) (0.196) (0.177) (0.195) 
Privatized -0.031  -0.034  -0.029 -0.030 -0.031 -0.024 
  (0.099) (0.107) (0.099) (0.107) (0.099) (0.106) 
Exporter -0.211  -0.254  -0.214 -0.254 -0.211 -0.242 
  (0.075)*** (0.089)*** (0.075)*** (0.087)*** (0.075)*** (0.086)*** 
Audited -0.285  -0.349  -0.283 -0.350 -0.285 -0.343 
  (0.070)***  (0.084)***  (0.070)*** (0.085)** (0.070)***  (0.085)*** 
Subsidized -0.072  -0.270  -0.074  -0.268  -0.073  -0.243 
  (0.090) (0.143)* (0.090) (0.142)* (0.090) (0.140)* 
Inverse Mill's ratio    0.294  0.294  0.247 
   (0.211)    (0.209)    (0.202) 
Country fixed effects  Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes 
Observations  2,082 2,005 2,082 2,005 2,082 2,005 
Pseudo  R-squared  0.12 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.13 
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is credit constrained. ‘Finance’ is one 
of the three financial variables from Table 4. Each finance variable is locality-specific and is constructed by 
weighting equally the respective financial variable for each parent bank which has at least one branch or 
subsidiary in that locality. Ommited category in firm size is ‘Medium firm’. ‘Inverse Mill’s ratio’ is the 
inverse of Mills’ratio from the probit model in Table 5 for each respective financial variable. Omitted 
categories from the probit equation in Table 5 are ‘Competition’ and ‘Firm age’. The analysis is performed on 
all firms present in the 2008 survey. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at 
the 10% level. See Appendix 1 for exact definitions. Source: BEEPS (2008) and Bankscope (2008). 
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Table 7.  
Probability of being constrained (2008 sample) 
         
Panel B. Branch-weighted bank data for each locality 
                    
   Finance = Equity/assets 
Finance =  
Tier 1 capital 
Finance =  
Gains on fin assets 
Finance -0.127  -0.147  -0.164 -0.165 0.103  0.259 
  (0.519)  (0.534) (0.081)**  (0.082)** (0.407)  (0.418) 
Small  firm  0.354 0.501 0.350 0.492 0.355 0.571 
  (0.081)*** (0.102)*** (0.081)*** (0.104)*** (0.084)*** (0.110)*** 
Big  firm  -0.093 -0.001 -0.189 -0.143 -0.188 -0.142 
  (0.181) (0.189) (0.186) (0.195) (0.186) (0.194) 
Public  company  0.268 0.243 0.318 0.303 0.325 0.317 
  (0.202) (0.211) (0.216) (0.227) (0.216) (0.226) 
Private company  -0.131 -0.193 -0.104 -0.133 -0.101 -0.133 
  (0.158) (0.169) (0.171) (0.183) (0.171) (0.182) 
Sole proprietorship  -0.022  -0.099  0.074  0.008  0.067  -0.027 
  (0.164) (0.186) (0.177) (0.196) (0.177) (0.196) 
Privatized -0.066  -0.094  -0.021 -0.020 -0.028 -0.035 
  (0.095) (0.103) (0.096) (0.107) (0.099) (0.107) 
Exporter -0.207  -0.261  -0.207 -0.259 -0.208 -0.259 
  (0.073)*** (0.085)*** (0.075)*** (0.085)*** (0.075)*** (0.086)*** 
Audited -0.275  -0.308  -0.249 -0.309 -0.247 -0.362 
  (0.067)*** (0.080)*** (0.070)*** (0.080)*** (0.070)*** (0.085)*** 
Subsidized  -0.123 -0.323 -0.124 -0.317 -0.073 -0.290 
  (0.087) (0.141)** (0.090) (0.141)** (0.090) (0.141)** 
Inverse Mill's ratio    0.311  0.298  0.340 
   (0.214)    (0.215)    (0.207)* 
Country fixed effects  Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes 
Observations  2,082 2,013 2,082 2,013 2,082 2,005 
Pseudo  R-squared  0.11 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.13 
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is credit constrained. ‘Finance’ is 
one of the three financial variables from Table 4. Each finance variable is locality-specific and is 
constructed by weighting by number of branches the respective financial variable for each parent bank 
which has at least one branch or subsidiary in that locality. Omitted category in firm size is ‘Medium firm’. 
‘Inverse Mill’s ratio’ is the inverse of Mills’ratio from the probit model in Table 5 for each respective 
financial variable. Omitted categories from the probit equation in Table 5 are ‘Competition’ and ‘Firm age’. 
The analysis is performed on all firms present in the 2008 survey. *** indicates significance at the 1% 
level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. See Appendix 1 for exact definitions. Source: BEEPS 
(2008) and Bankscope (2008). 
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Table 8.  
Probability of being constrained (pooled 2005 and 2008 samples) 
                    
Panel A. Equally weighted bank data for each locality
   Finance = Equity/assets 
Finance =  
Tier 1 capital 
Finance =  
Gains on fin assets 
Finance  0.059 0.060 -0.162 -0.159 0.009 -0.001 
 (0.074)  (0.074)  (0.128)  (0.129)*  (0.022)  (0.022) 
Inverse Mill's ratio    -0.154    -0.154    -0.150 
   (0.094)*    (0.093)*    (0.076)** 
Country fixed effects  Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes 
Observations 2,373  2,344  2,373  2,344  2,422  2,393 
Pseudo R-squared  0.14  0.15  0.14  0.15  0.14  0.14 
Panel B. Branch-weighted bank data for each locality
   Finance = Equity/assets 
Finance =  
Tier 1 capital 
Finance =  
Gains on fin assets 
Finance -0.073  -0.071  -0.089 -0.096 -0.008 -0.007 
 (0.043)*  (0.043)*  (0.052)*  (0.050)**  (0.009)  (0.009) 
Inverse Mill's ratio    -0.156    -0.122    -0.091 
   (0.094)*    (0.080)*    (0.050)* 
Country fixed effects  Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes 
Observations 2,373  2,344  2,373  2,344  2,422  2,393 
Pseudo R-squared  0.14  0.15  0.14  0.15  0.14  0.14 
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is credit constrained. ‘Finance’ is 
one of the three financial variables from Table 4. Each finance variable is locality-specific and is 
constructed by weighting equally (Panel A) or by number of branches (Panel B) the respective financial 
variable for each parent bank which has at least one branch or subsidiary in that locality. ‘Inverse Mill’s 
ratio’ is the inverse of Mills’ratio from the probit model in Table 5 for each respective financial variable. 
The regressions also include the rest of the independent variables from table 6. Omitted categories from the 
probit equation in Table 5 are ‘Competition’ and ‘Firm age’. The analysis is performed on all firms present 
in the 2008 survey. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. 
See Appendix 1 for exact definitions. Source: BEEPS (2005 and 2008) and Bankscope (2005 and 2008). 
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Table 9.  
Probability of being constrained, foreign banks dominated localities 
                    
Panel A. 2008 sample
   Finance = Equity/assets 
Finance =  
Tier 1 capital 
Finance =  
Gains on fin assets 
Finance -0.017  -0.052  -0.386 -0.349 0.168  -0.789 
 (0.010)*  (0.087)  (0.212)*  (0.169)**  (0.148)  (0.787) 
Inverse Mill's ratio  0.662  0.616 0.635 0.563 0.646 0.648 
 (0.359)*  (0.358)*  (0.359)*  (0.361)  (0.361)*  (0.356)* 
Country fixed effects  Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes 
Observations 1,178  1,178  1,178  1,178  1,178  1,178 
Pseudo R-squared  0.11  0.11  0.09  0.11  0.09  0.11 
Panel B. Pooled 2008 and 2005 samples
   Finance = Equity/assets 
Finance =  
Tier 1 capital 
Finance =  
Gains on fin assets 
Finance -0.367  -0.153  -0.829 -0.576 -0.369 -0.004 
 (0.295)  (0.075)**  (0.503)*  (0.300)**  (0.222)*  (0.015) 
Inverse Mill's ratio  -0.022 -0.083 -0.017 -0.021 -0.078 -0.034 
 (0.117)  (0.091)  (0.116)  (0.117)  (0.088)  (0.055) 
Country fixed effects  Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes 
Observations 1,372  1,372  1,372  1,372  1,403  1,403 
Pseudo R-squared  0.16  0.16  0.16  0.16  0.16  0.16 
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is credit constrained. ‘Finance’ is 
one of the three financial variables from Table 4. Each finance variable is locality-specific and is 
constructed by weighting equally (Columns 1, 3, and 5) or by number of branches (Columns 2, 4, and 6) 
the respective financial variable for each parent bank which has at least one branch or subsidiary in that 
locality. ‘Inverse Mill’s ratio’ is the inverse of Mills’ratio from the probit model in Table 5 for each 
respective financial variable. The regressions also include the rest of the independent variables from table 
6. The analysis is performed on all firms present in the 2008 survey (Panel A) and on the pooled sample of 
firms present either in the 2008 or the 2005 survey (Panel B). Only localities where more than 67% of 
banking assets are owned by branches or subsidiaries of foreign banks are included in the regressions. *** 
indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. See Appendix 1 for exact 
definitions. Source: BEEPS (2005 and 2008) and Bankscope (2005 and 2008). 
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Table 10.  
Probability of being constrained: foreign vs. domestic banks 
                    
Panel A. 2008 sample
   Finance = Equity/assets 
Finance =  
Tier 1 capital 
Finance =  
Gains on fin assets 
Finance*Foreign -0.011  -0.182  -0.451  -0.222  0.147  -0.549 
 (0.007)*  (0.095)**  (0.191)**  (0.125)*  (0.092)  (0.758) 
Finance  -0.009 0.109 0.173 -0.056 0.088 -0.641 
  (0.006) (0.089)  (0.066)***  (0.120) (0.069) (0.707) 
Foreign    0.339 1.388 3.574 2.752 0.353 0.079 
 (0.190)*  (0.654)**  (1.439)***  (1.795)  (0.201)  (0.253) 
Inverse Mill's ratio  0.515  0.482 0.510 0.444 0.503 0.508 
  (0.310) (0.309) (0.313) (0.310) (0.312) (0.308) 
Country fixed effects  Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes 
Observations  1,428 1,428 1,428 1,428 1,428 1,428 
Pseudo  R-squared  0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 
Panel B. Pooled 2008 and 2005 samples
   Finance = Equity/assets 
Finance =  
Tier 1 capital 
Finance =  
Gains on fin assets 
Finance*Foreign  -0.570 -0.210 0.345 -0.098 -0.121 -0.016 
 (0.346)*  (0.074)***  (0.240)  (0.116)  (0.359)  (0.017) 
Finance 0.043  0.053  -0.167 -0.002 -0.038 -0.001 
  (0.093) (0.061) (0.166) (0.095) (0.031) (0.019) 
Foreign    0.467 1.511 0.204 1.018 0.455 0.142 
 (0.196)**  (0.504)***  (0.203)  (1.022)  (0.297)*  (0.178) 
Inverse Mill's ratio  -0.598 -0.437 -0.597 -0.430 -0.476 -0.253 
  (0.088)*** (0.074)*** (0.088)*** (0.074)*** (0.075)*** (0.052)*** 
Country fixed effects  Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes 
Observations  1,650 1,650 1,650 1,650 1,696 1,710 
Pseudo  R-squared  0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13 
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is credit constrained. ‘Finance’ is 
one of the three financial variables from Table 4. Each finance variable is locality-specific and is 
constructed by weighting equally (Columns 1, 3, and 5) or by number of branches (Columns 2, 4, and 6) 
the respective financial variable for each parent bank which has at least one branch or subsidiary in that 
locality. ‘Foreign’ is a dummy equal to 1 if the share of branches in each locality owned by branches or 
subsidiaries of foreign banks is more than 2/3, and to 0 if it is less than 1/3. ‘Inverse Mill’s ratio’ is the 
inverse of Mills’ratio from the probit model in Table 5 for each respective financial variable. The 
regressions also include the rest of the independent variables from table 6. The analysis is performed on all 
firms present in the 2008 survey (Columns (2), (4), and (6)) and on the subsample of firms present in both 
the 2008 and the 2005 survey (Columns (3), (5), and (7)). All regressions include country and industry 
fixed effects (Panel A), and country, industry, and year fixed efefcts (Panel B). *** indicates significance at 
the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. See Appendix 1 for exact definitions. Source: 
BEEPS (2005 and 2008) and Bankscope (2005 and 2008). 
 2010 June45
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1203
Table 11.  
Probability of being constrained: differential effects 
                    
Panel A. Equally weighted bank data for each locality
Tier 1 capital  * Exporter  -0.027     
 (0.049)     
Tier 1 capital * R&D intensity    -0.123   
   (0.063)**   
Tier 1 capital * capital intensity      -0.026 
     (0.044) 
City fixed effects  Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes 
Observations  1,226 1,226 1,226 
Pseudo  R-squared  0.15 0.16 0.16 
Panel B. Branch-weighted bank data for each locality
Tier 1 capital  * Exporter  -0.155     
 (0.078)**     
Tier 1 capital * R&D intensity    -0.182   
   (0.098)*  
Tier 1 capital * capital intensity      -0.186 
     (0.080)** 
City fixed effects  Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes 
Observations  1,226 1,226 1,226 
Pseudo  R-squared  0.16 0.16 0.16 
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is credit constrained. ‘Finance’ is 
one of the three financial variables from Table 4. Each finance variable is locality-specific and is 
constructed by weighting equally (Panel A) or by number of branches (Panel B) the respective financial 
variable for each parent bank which has at least one branch or subsidiary in that locality. ‘R&D intensity’ is 
a dummy equal to 1 if the industry is in the top 50% of the distribution of industry medians of the ratio of 
research and development expenses to sales for mature Compustat firms over the period 1990-2000. 
‘Capital intensity’ is a dummy equal to 1 if the industry is in the bottom 50% of the distribution of industry 
medians of capital usage per worker with external funds for mature Compustat firms over the period 1990-
2000. ‘Inverse Mill’s ratio’ is the inverse of Mills’ratio from the probit model in Table 5 for each respective 
financial variable. The regressions also include the rest of the independent variables from table 6. The 
analysis is performed on all firms present in the 2008 survey. All regressions include city and industry 
fixed effects. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. See 
Appendix 1 for exact definitions. Source: BEEPS (2008) and Bankscope (2008). 
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Appendix 2. Domestic and parent banks in the sample 
    
Country  Bank  Parent bank and country of incorporation 
Albania  Alpha Bank  Alpha Bank - Greece 
  Raiffeisen  Raiffeisen - Austira 
  Banka Kombetare Trektare  domestic 
  Tirana Bank  Pireus Bank - Greece 
  Intessa San Paolo Bank Albania  Intessa San Paolo - Italy 
  National Bank of Greece  National Bank of Greece 
  Emporiki  Emporiki Bank - Greece 
 Banka  Credins  domestic 
Bulgaria  Alpha bank  Alpha Bank - Greece 
  Unicredit Bulbank  UniCredit Group - Italy 
  DSK  OTP - Hungary 
  First Investment Bank  domestic 
  PostBank  EFG Eurobank - Greece 
  Expressbank  Societe Generale - France 
  United Bulgarian Bank  National Bank of Greece 
  Reiffeisen  Raiffeisen - Austira 
  Piraeus  Piraeus Bank - Greece 
Croatia  Zagrebaska Bank  UniCredit Group - Italy 
  Privredna Bank Zagreb  Intessa San Paolo - Italy 
  Erste & Steiermarkische Bank  Erste Group - Austria 
  Raiffeisen Bank  Raiffeisen - Austria 
  Societe Generale - Splitska Banka  Societe Generale - France 
  Hypo Alde Adria Bank  Hypo Group - Austria 
  OTP Banka Hrvatska  OTP - Hungary 
 Slavonska  Banka  domestic 
  Hrvatska Postanska Banka  domestic 
Czech Republic  Ceska Sporitelna  Erste Group - Austria 
  CSOB  KBC - Belgium 
  Komercni Banka  Societe Generale - France 
  UniCredit Bank CR  UniCredit Group - Italy 
  Citibank  Citibank - US 
  Ceskomoravska zarucni a rozvojova banka  domestic 
  GE Money Bank  GE Money - US 
  Hypotecni Banka  KBC - Belgium 
  Raiffeisenbank  Raiffeisen - Austira 
Estonia  Swedbank Estonia  Swedbank - Sweden 
  SEB  Skandinavska Enskilda Banken - Sweden 
  Sampo Pank  Danske Pank - Denmark 
  Nordea  Nordea Bank - Finland 
Hungary OTP  Bank  domestic 
  K&H Commercial and Credit Bank  KBC - Belgium 
  MKB Bank  Bayerische Landesbank - Germany 
  CIB Bank  Intessa San Paolo - Italy 
  Raiffeisen Bank  Raiffeisen - Austira 
  Erste Bank Hungary  Erste Group - Austria 
  KDB Bank  KDB Seoul - Korea 
  UniCredit Bank Hungary  UniCredit Group - Italy 
Latvia Parex  domestic 
 Hansabank  Swedbank  -  Sweden 
  Latvijas Krajbanka  Snoras Bank - Lithuania 
 SMP  Bank  domestic 
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Lithuania  SEB  Skandinavska Enskilda Banken - Sweden 
  Sampo Pank  Danske Pank - Denmark 
  Nordea  Nordea Bank - Finland 
 Snoras  Bank  domestic 
 Ukio  Bankas  domestic 
 Hansabankas  Swedbank  -  Sweden 
  Parex Bankas  Parex Group - Latvia 
Macedonia  Alpha Bank  Alpha Bank - Greece 
  Stopanska Banka  National Bank of Greece 
 Komercijalna  Banka  domestic 
  NLB Tutunska Banka  NLB - Slovenia 
  Ohridska Banka  Societe Generale - France 
  Pro Credit Bank  Pro Credit Group 
Montenegro AtlasMont  Bank  domestic 
  Crnogorska Komercijalna Banka  OTP - Hungary 
  Hypo-Alpe-Adria Bank  Hypo Group - Austria 
  Komercijalna Banka ad Budva  domestic 
  NLB Montenegro Banka  NLB - Slovenia 
  Prva Banka Crne Gore  domestic 
 Invest  Banka  Montenegro  domestic 
  Podgoricka Banka SG  Societe Generale - France 
 Opportunity  Bank  domestic 
Poland PKO  Bank  domestic 
  Bank Pekao  UniCredit Group - Italy 
  Bank BPH  UniCredit Group - Italy 
  Bank Zachodni WBK  AIB - Ireland 
  ING Bank Slaski  ING Bank - Netherlands 
 Bank  Pocztowy  domestic 
  Kredyt Bank  KBC - Belgium 
 mBank  Commerzbank  -  Germany 
 Getin  Bank  domestic 
Romania  BCR  Erste Group - Austria 
  BRD Group Societe General  Societe Generale - France 
  Volksbank Romania  Volksbank - Austria 
  Raiffeisen Bank  Raiffeisen - Austira 
  Alpha Bank Romania  Alpha Bank - Greece 
  UniCredit Tiriac Bank  UniCredit Group - Italy 
 Banca  Transilvania  domestic 
  Bancpost  EFG Eurobank - Greece 
 CEC  Bank  domestic 
Slovakia  Vseobecna Uverova banka  Intessa San Paolo - Italy 
  Slovenska Sporitelna  Erste Group - Austria 
  Tatra Banka  Raiffeisen - Austira 
  OTP Banka Slovensko  OTP - Hungary 
  Dexia Banka Slovensko  Dexia - Belgium 
  UniCredit Bank Slovakia  UniCredit Group - Italy 
  Volksbank Slovensko  Volksbank - Austria 
  CSOB Slovakia  KBC - Belgium 
Slovenia  Nova Ljubljanska Banka  KBC - Belgium 
  Nova Kreditna Banka Maribor  domestic 
 Abanka  domestic 
  SKB  Societe Generale - France 
  UniCredit  UniCredit Group - Italy 
  Banka Koper  Intessa San Paolo - Italy 
 Banka  Celje  domestic 
  Reiffeisen Krekova banka  Raiffeisen - Austira 
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